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The quandary over how to structure the relationship between
religion and the civil state is an ancient one. From the
perspective of political philosophy this is the religion question,
and events over many centuries have proven that the answer is
easy to get wrong. Religion, by its very definition, is the fixed
point from which all else is surveyed. It is about ultimate
matters, both micro and macro. Hence, religion addresses the
irreducible core of personhood and its meaning, while at the
same time religion embraces a worldview that transcends and
encompasses everything else. Religion generates intense
emotions that when acted upon can breach the peace, and
religion forms deep loyalties that can rival the patriotic ties that
bind citizens to their nation-state. Religion is simultaneously
individualistic, about highly personal beliefs and acts of humble
piety growing out of those belefs, while at the same time religion
is nearly always manifested in the form of a sacred group or
institution that knits together those of like-minded faith in local,
national, and even transnational churches, temples, and mosques.
THE CAUSE OF CONSCIENCE
Primary to governance and the religion question is the matter
of individual conscience, that is, religiously informed conscience.
So far as the positive law is concerned, individuals can hold
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privately anK religious belief they want. After all, even if it
wantedto, the state is ill-equipped to police the inner precincts
of the mind. When religious Vilk act on their beliefs, however,
then the civil and even criminal law takes note. A basic duty of
any state is to maintain the public peace, thus the law is there to
protect persons and their property. Religious practices, however
sincere, cannot be allowed to go beyond a point where others are
directly and palpably harmed or the enjoyment of their property
materially diminished. Accordinly, actions by the conscience-
driven believer can be accommodated by the positive law, but
only "so far."
Determining "how far" is the common starting point in
puzzling out the various facets of the religion question. In the
West, nation-states shifted first from religious conformity to
religious tolerance. Tolerance is when a state condescends to
allow religious conduct which it has the lawful power to prohibit.
Later, there was a shift from tolerance to recognition of a rights-
based claim to follow one's religiously informed conscience. 'his
rights-claim has its origin, in part, in the belief that for law to
intervene too soon works to stifle people in their most basic of
religious practices, namely obeying God as called (by their lights)
to do so. Open societies in t e West justly took price in
permitting the spirit-moved conscience of citizens considerable
breathinii room to follow God's plan (as they understand it) for
their lif-. As James Madison wrote in his Memorial and
Remonstrance, revered as the single most important American
writing on religious freedom, "This duty [to the Creator] is
precedent, both in order of time and in degree of obligation, to
the claims of Civil Society."'
While a modem spirit of liberality now attends and shapes the
"how far" question in ways favorable to religion's unfettered
exercise, lines still must be drawn that account for modem
societal complexities such as human health and safety. Short of
preventing violence or other direct harm to third parties, the
question devolves to asking whether there are times when the
state may justly abridge actions (or refusals to act) of individuals
that are lodged in their religiously informed conscience.
Examples familiar to the generation present at the American
founding are Quakers refusing to heed a call to serve in the
military and Mennonites declining to swear an oath when asked
to give court-compelled testimony. Under what circumstances
may the reliiousl motivated conscience suffer direct coercion
because faith s calito obedience, if multiplied by similar acts of
1. James Madison, Jr., "A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,"
1 (1785), in The Papers of James Madison, ed. Robert A. Rutland, et al. (Chicago, Ill.:
University of Chicago Press, 1973), 8: 299.
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disobedience, would seriously impede, even destabilize, the
nation-state? A contemporary example is a religious objector to
an ongoing war refusing to file a federal income tax return.
Early sugestions for gauging "how far" were to narrow the
definition otprotected religion or, contrariwise, to sharply curtail
the scope of legitimate state power. For example, John Locke is
read by modernists to have confined unfettered religion to
thoughts bearing on the life hereafter and little else, wvhereas
early Anabaptists disavowed most civic duties with respect to all
the works and ways of government. But these models were
either too extreme or too simplistic, and in any event, neither the
religious authorities nor government officials were willing to be
con'fined to the definitional boxes constructed by these social
philosophers.
Legpl disputes over the cause of conscience typically involve
small sects whose religious practices are out ofstep with the
dominant culture. America today enjoys a large and stable civil
society, and thus is able to absorb much in the way of
countercultural reli *ous exercise. Nonetheless, there is in the
nation's past heavy-handed dealings concerning polygamy among
nineteenth-century Mormons, the suppression o1 Jehovah's
Witnesses as a result of their aggressive proselytizing and
pacifism in the midst of the twentieS-century world wars, and
more recently the prosecution of sacramental peyote ingestion by
members of- the Native American Church. in each of these
instances, and others, a believed need for law and order prevailed
over religious exercise. The initial instinct of law enf6rcement
was that the public peace was dangerously breached and thus the
limits of accommodation had been crossed. These law enforce-
ment interventions had popular backing when first taken, but
that support has since ebbed as the perceived danger has
receded Tith time.
Although their first inclination is to let religious people alone,
present-day Americans are not unaware of the increasing
intensity ot various religious faiths and the societal decentering
that has accompanied religious pluralism. Daily news reports
remind us of global terrorism by Islamic extremists. Thus, there
is much ambivalence with respect to how the domestic law
should adjust to acts of religious conscience. As a people,
Americans both celebrate the principle of religious iberty while
nodding in grudging a reement with Justice Antonin Scalia who
writing tor amajority the United States Supreme Court, stated
that slpecial deference for religious exercise is a destabilizing plea
for a private right to ignore generally applicable laws."2
2. Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) at 886.
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CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
The foregoing gives shape to the religion question insofar as
the juridical task is to say "how far" with respect to relations
between government and individual religious adherents. That is
the first liSf of governance and the religion-question puzzle. The
second half of the religion question is quite different. It is to
ponder how best to structure relations between the civil state and
organized religion, that is, between the organs of government
and the church and related religious groups.3 This is the task of
surveying the metes and bounds oT wlat is prohibited (and
permittel) in the interaction between church anc state.
Almost without fail religion is a communal affair. People of
like-minded faith pull together-voluntarily for the most part,
but typically urged, if not commanded, by their religion to do so.
There are, of course, several churches rather than one. Indeed,
America has many religious organizations, both church and para-
church, and many organized religions-Christianity, Islam,
Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and so forth. But, f6r ease in
writinQ, this structuring-of-a-relationship task is conventionally
labelet as the matter of church-state relations, and it is to be
distinguished from the aforementioned relationship between
state and individual adherents.
This second half of the religion question has proven to be the
more difficult. It is one thing to ask of the positive law to draw a
line ("how far") with respect to the countercultural practices-
typically nonviolent--of individual religionists. it is quite
another to ask of civil law to first define, and then to fairly
mediate in the judicial courts, the relationship between these two
centers of authority: state and church. In one respect this is
similar to a separation of powers problem familiar to
constitutional law. The juridical task is to police a boundary-
often disputed and, in close cases, a barely distinct line-
between the state's jurisdiction or competence and the province
or purview of organized religion.
CO-OPTING THE STATE
Churches, as noted above, are not merely local organizations,
but are often national and even transnational. In some instances,
the religious body in question pre-existed the civil state and
might well outlast it. Churches thereby hold considerable
3. By "organized religion" is meant not only churches and other religious groups, but also
identifiable systems of religion such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hindu, Buddhism, and
the like, as well as their subdivisions such as Presbyterian, Catholic, Reformed Judaism, and
Sunni.
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authority and thus can openly challenge or otherwise confront
the state. An opposite and more common tendency of organized
religion is to try to co-opt the state. An individul-at east an
individual of serious fait-holds allegiance to God and country,
sort of dual citizenship so to speak. There is an unfortunate
tendency to confuse the two. This is to be expected, for it is
human nature not to live a dichotomy, but to seek an integrated
world and life view. However, to radically conflate God and
country to uncritically make sacred the politics and temporal
aims of the civil state, has proven dangerous. The state as
"chosen nation," "redeemer republic," or "new Israel" has not
worked out well in practice, being harmful to the religiously
pious as well as destructive of just government. A just
government is one actively aware of its-limited authority and
thereby ever mindful that its writ has no competence with
respect to matters within the purview of the church.
Accordingly, even when a transient majority of a state's citizens
support en legislation or favor a particular policy, the subject
of-'hich lies en irely within the sphere of organized religion, a
properly conceived state has a duty to resist the popular majority
ancfdecline to exceed its jurisdictional constraints.
A simple illustration will draw out the point. In Western
experience, it has proven destructive of both state and church to
require by law regular church attendance. Attendance at
worship services is a subject matter understood to be wholly
within the purview of the church. Lapsed laity is a matter for
pastoral visits and perhaps sanction as a result of church
dliscipine, not the cnmina courts. If such a statute were to be
enforced by civil officials, soon the citizenry would be embroiled
in a debate over the necessity of collective worship and how one
keeps the Sabbath holy. That would disrupt and divide the body
politic over purely religious matters. Of course, civic debate is
commonplace andprotected as a matter of free speech, but here
the political dispute involves questions that are entirely about
one' s duty to God. The outcome may affect the status of one's
soul but it ought not to affect the status of one's citizenship. The
church likewise is harmed by this legislation because a forced
attendance at worship services would, in the scheme of our
underlying sensibilities, produce an insincere and false faith. At
the same time, and witliout contradiction, it is common for the
state to enact programs that aid the poor and needy, and for the
church to advocate and affirm such social-service programs with
respect to the proper role (as the church views itY of a just
overnment. Such public welfare laws are not thought to breach
e line between state and church- rather, both entities are seen
as acting within their proper, albeit overlapping, spheres of
power. Taking the illustration one step further, we could fashion
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a third law whereby city police deputize church leaders, vesting
them with power to arrest for trespass unauthorized users of a
center-city parking lot owned by the local church. The unaccept-
ability of transferring the power of arrest to church officials is
more than apparent to American sensibilities.4
Obviously there is jurisdictional line-drawing going on in this
three-part illustration. We have little problem saying that the
first law involves inherently religious subject matter and thus is
outside the state's sphere of competence, whereas the second law
is a proper object for involvement by both state and church.
However, it is axiomatic that government retains a near mono-
poly on lawful violence, thus the third law is an improper
aelegation of the state's sovereign power. It is unavoidable that
these three judgment calls-with respect to the church-state
boundary-are made with implicit reference to an experience
rooted in Western civilization. Accordingly, defining this
boundary between church and state-thus answering the second
half of the rehion question in a multiplicity of circumstances-is
to make value-laden judgments. Whether realized or
unconscious, these line-drawing judgments are rooted in
Western sensibilities about limits on the jurisdiction of the civil
state and its duty to resist co-optation by the church and to resist
intruding into matters in the purview of organized religion.
CIVIL RELIGION
History also shows that churches and like organizations can be
threatened by the state and in two ways: by suppression and by
capture. In that vein, to establish a church is not only to officially
suppress all other religious bodies, but establishment also brings
intense resentment against, and eventual decline of, the official
church. As the United States Supreme Court observed in one of
its early modern cases:
The history of governmentally established religion, both in England and in this country,
showed that whenever government had allied itself with one particular form of religion,
the inevitable result had been that it had incurred the hatred, disrespect and even
contempt of those who held contrary beliefs. That same history showed that many
people had lost their respect for any religion that had relied upon the support of
government to spread its faith.5
Contrariwise, disestablishment not only relieves the
discriminatory treatment suffered by all other religious bodies,
4. Although such cases are rare, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), is an
example of government unconstitutionally delegating its sovereign power to a religious body.
In Larkin, the Court struck down a municipal ordinance which gave churches the power to
veto the issuance of a liquor license to nearby restaurants and taverns.
5. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) at 431 (footnotes omitted).
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but it deregulates, and thereby liberates from state capture, the
formerly established faith. Justice William Brennan observed
how an established church can become an unfortunate captive of
the state in this way: "[One] purpose of separation and neutrality
is to keep the state from interfenng in the essential autonomy of
religious life, either by taking upon itself the decision of religious
issues, or by unduly involving itself in the supervision of religious
institutions or officials."6 When a church is disestablished, no
Ionger is its order of worship (liturgy and prayer books) regulated
by faw, no longer are ecclesiasticaYppointments subject to state
approval, and no longer are its c=erics taken for granted as
chaplains to the temporal power.
Republics need -broad consent (or acquiescence) from the
people to initially constitute a body politic, and thereafter to
remain unified and thus endure. Just how deeply held must
these consensual ties be for a state to remain legitimate? Out of
self-preservation, even liberal republics tend to err on the side of
forrming strong patriotic and even nationalistic ties that will hold
the allegiance ol its citizens. A state may seek to reinforce these
citizen-unifying principles by a propriating widely held religious
propositions for its own. i this in mind, suppose a nation-
state were to recite on ceremonial occasions the ecumenical
prayers of its majority faiths and invite the public's voluntary
participation. This surely burdens minority religious, but only
indirectly. After all, there is no coercion of conscience with
respect to the public prayers, because the members of minority
faiths (or of no faith) retain the freedom to simply not participate.
But state-recited prayers can cause feelings of alienation, even
spawning resentment and division along religious lines.
Moreover, the state-recited prayers can, with repetition, be
harmful as well to the majority fiths. Government officials are
composing the prayers and rendering them nondenominational
(i.e., inoffensive) for the masses. This waters down the
theological content of the prayers and lessens their spiritual
efficacy.
In a worse-case scenario, this harm ripens into civil religion,
which is a culturally captive faith that confuses genuine religion
with a love of country, a pride in national traditions, and entrance
into full acceptance as a citizen of the republic. The harm of civil
religion, whire not coercive of conscience, is that religious belief
is not arrived at freely and without cultural conformity, and it
soon turns insincere, eventually corrupting both laity and church.
From theperspective of the church, civil reliion is a form of soft
idolatry. GaryWills, in a biting commentary 'tat leaves no doubt
6. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) at 803-04 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes
omitted).
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as to his disdain for civil religion, surveyed the American
landscape with these words:
[R]eligion plays a very political role here. By acquiescing in the standards of our rulers,
the churches give them tacit endorsement ....
... Thus is religion trapped, frozen, in its perpetual de facto accommodation of
[governmental] power. It becomes a social ornament and buttress, not changing men's
lives, only blessing them . . . . Religion is invited in on sufferance, to praise our
country, our rulers, our past and present, our goals and pretensions, under the polite
fiction of praying for them all. The divine is subordinated to the human-God serves
Caesar. This is what Americans quaintly call "freedom of religion," and what the Bible
calls idolatry.7
Whether one agrees with Wills' depiction of the degree to
which civil religion holds sway in Ameica, he starts to lay bare
one of two extremes. Both extremes are answers-wrong
answers-to the second half of the religion question. One is that
God serves Caesar (autocracy) and the other is that God is
Caesar (theocracy). Both extremes lead to religious persecution.
In milder forms, the two tendencies still result in a loss of
religious freedom. In blurring the line between religion and the
state, it is genuine religion, observed Justice Brennan, that is
evey bit as likely a loser as civil liberty: "It is not only the
nonbeliever who fears the injection of sectarian doctrines and
controversies into the civil polity, but in as high degree it is the
devout believer who fears the secularization of a creed which
becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the
government." 8
VOLUNTARYISM
The task of governance is to answer this second half of the
religion question with balance as between these two extremes
even in their milder forms of civil religion and of established
religion. Once again, James Madison's Memorial helps to point
the way:
If "all men are by nature equally free and independent," all men are to be considered
as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and therefore
retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. . . . Whilst we assert for
ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess and to observe the Religion which we
believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an equal freedom to those whose minds
have not yet yielded to the evidence which has convinced us. 9
7. Garry Wills, Bare Ruined Choirs: Doubt, Prophecy, and Radical Religion (New York:
Dell Publishing Co., 1972), 259-60.
8. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) at 259 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (footnotes omitted).
9. James Madison, Jr., "A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,"
4 (1785), in The Papers of James Madison, ed. Robert A. Rutland, et al. (Chicago, II: The
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This is the principle of voluntaryism: religious belief is best
arrived at voluntanily, without the active assistance of
government, and this is equally so for everyone.10 Church
membership and financial contributions would likewise follow
the voluntary principle. Following a period of state-by-state
disestablishments during the years _1776 to 1833, the Amierican
church-state proposition came to subscribe to voluntaryism as
desirable for stabilizing republics as well as desirable for
liberating organized religion. The new American republic, filled
as it was with both religious fervency and religious uralism, was
thereby made more commodious both to the faifh of reigious
minorities and to that of the previously established majority. No
longer was a person's position on purely religious disputes also a
prerequisite for enjoying the fun rights of citizenship. This
expanded civil libe .- At the same time, voluntaryism
reinvigorated organized religion in the early national period, with
explosive growth among Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, the
upstart Campbellites, and others.ii Henceforth, a church grew(or not) based on persuasion and its appeal to the people.
It follows that established churches, once the props of
government had been removed, would suffer an initiaf decline.
This is because under even mild establishments some individualsjoined the church to avoid official discrimination or to gain
political advantage. This resulted in spiritual shallowness.
Madison, in a letter written in 1819, made note of this with
respect to the disestablished Anglican-now Episcopalian-
church in Virginia:
[B]uilt under the establishment at the public expense, [they] have in many instances
gone to ruin, or are in a very dilapidated state, owing chiefly to a transition of the flocks
to other worships. . . . [whereas concerning the evangelicals,] on a general
comparison of present and former times the balance is certainly and vastly on the side
of the present, as to the number of religious teachers, the zeal which actuates them, the
purity of their lives, and the attendance of the people on their instructions. 12
University of Chicago Press, 1973), 8: 300-01, (quoting from the Virginia Declaration of
Rights, adopted in 1776).
10. The use of the older spelling of "voluntaryism" is intentional. It serves to remind the
reader that voluntaryism is a particular insight from a period of time in Western religious
and American political thought. See Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the
American People, 2" ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004), 379-84.
11. Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and
Losers in Our Religious Economy, 2"" ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press,
2005), 55-116; see generally Mark A. Noll, America's God, From Jonathan Edwards to
Abraham Lincoln (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); John H. Wigger, Taking Heaven
by Storm: Methodism and the Rise of Popular Christianity in America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998).
12. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (2 March 1819), Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison, Fourth President of the United States (Philadelphia, 1865), 3:
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Concerning the consequences, civil and religious, of
disestablishment and the resulting revivals in Virginia and
elsewhere, Madison gave his opinion in correspondence sent in
1822:
The example of the colonies, now States, which rejected religious establishments
altogether, proved that all sects might be safely and advantageously put on a footing of
equal and entire freedom. . . . [lilt is impossible to deny that [in Virginia] religion
prevails with more zeal and a more exemplary priesthood than it ever did when
established and patronized by public authority. We are teaching the world that great
truth that governments do better without kings and nobles than with them. The merit
will be doubled by the other lesson: that religion flourishes in greater purity without
than with the aid of government. 13
Left to the people the entrepreneurial faiths flourished, while
those unable to adjust quickly to a free-market approach
struggled.
As previously noted, a feature of the second half of the
religion question is that churches and other religious
communities can rival and even threaten the state. Such nvalry
has proven bad for civil liberties when organized religion
successfully co-opts the state by seizing temporal power.
Conversely, rivalry between church and state has proven good for
civil liberties when religious bodies are free to call into question
and check a government that has authoritarian pretensions, has
taken up a misguided policy, or is beset with corruption. History
is marked with incidents, from Poland to the Philippines, where
the church was the last remaining institution able to speak truth
to the power of a hegemonic state. Less drastic, but more
common to our American setting, is that religious bodies
frequently raise up what they call their "prophetic voice" and
criticize officials and their policies of state. Contrariwise, where
churches are too beholden to Kovemment, the pulpits are likely
to stand silent in the face of official wrongdoing.
RELIGION'S EXCEPTIONALISM
At this juncture it can fairly be asked why the civil law
regards organized religion as exceptional. just how is it that this
particular relationship, state and church, calls for special
treatment by the law? Groups, all private-sector groups, are
aggregates of individuals in voluntary association. But religious
organizations are regarded by the judicial courts as different. As
Justice Brennan astutely observed, "Such a community
124-25.
13. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (10 July 1822), Letters and Other
Writings of James Madison, Fourth President of the United States (Philadelphia, 1865), 3:
273, 275-76.
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represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic
entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuaqs."14
Churches are ontolo ical entities, notmere creatures of the state.
They possess a life of their own not reducible to the sum of their
member's individual rights, and Western civilization has so
acknowledged.
In the West, since the fourth century, relations between state
and church have been aptly characterized as a dual-authority
pattern.15 In that century, the Edict of Milan (A.D. 313), issued
by Constantine as Western Roman Emperor, directed that
Christianity was no longer illegal but to be tolerated. Favoritism
soon followed which eventually gave way to Emperor Theodosius
I's edicts in 380-81, establishing the Christian church to the
exclusion of all other religions. This transition period, however,
was not without conflict between the two powers. For example,
Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, wrote the Emperor Constantius
around 350 about his conception of church and empire as
follows:
Do not interfere in matters ecclesiastical, nor give us orders on such questions, but
learn about them from us. For into your hands God has put the kingdom; the affairs of
his Church he has committed to us. If any man stole the Empire from you, he would
be resisting the ordinance of God: in the same way you on your part should be afraid
lest, in taking upon yourself the government of the Church, you incur the guilt of a
grave offense. "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the
things that are God's." We are not permitted to exercise an earthly rule; and you, Sire,
are not authorized to burn incense. 6
In 358, Emperor Constantius attempted to unite Christians in
opposition to the Nicene Creed. Nis attempt soon drew this
rebiuff from Athanasius, the powerful bishop oT Alexandria and a
supporter of the creed: "When did a judgement of the church
receive its validity from the Emperor?"17
This vigorous sparring over the boundary of authority
between state and church did not end with the formal
establishment of Christianity. Writing to the Byzantine Emperor
Anastasis I in 494, Pope Gelasius I explicitly laid out the dual-
authority relationship: "Two there are, august Emperor, by
14. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) at 342 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
15. See John F. Wilson & Donald L. Drakeman, Church and State in American History,
3'd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2003), 1-10.
16. Henry Bettenson, ed., Documents of the Christian Church, 2"d ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 19.
17. A Lion Handbook: The History of Christianity, rev. ed. (1990), 144. Athanasius went
on, albeit not entirely accurate as to his history, "There have been many councils held until
the present and many judgements passed by the church; but the church leaders never
sought the consent of the Emperor for them nor did the Emperor busy himself with the
affairs of the church." Ibid.
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which this world is ruled on title of original and sovereign right-
the consecrated authority of the priesthood and the royal
power."18 Gelasius proceeded however, to argue for a vision of
the dual order where the papal office was superior to that of the
emperor. 19
Things change, of course, with state and church constantly
adapting and making adjustments. Western political theory and
eccresiolog, existing side by side in the same time and space,
competed'and their devotees brought to bear ideological and (at
times) even military pressure on the other. As a result, the exact
placement of the line between nation-state and church has
shifted over time, first in Western Europe and then in America.
Lecturing on international comparative law, Roscoe Pound, then
dean at 'Harvard Law School, was identifying those received
recepts, those assumed starting points, those presuppositions
wom hich judges unconsciously draw to reach a result that is
reasonable and just. One such fundamental principle is that
church and state have long been regarded as distinct centers of
authority:
In the politics and law of the Middle Ages the distinction between the spiritual and the
temporal, between the jurisdiction of religiously organized Christendom and the
jurisdiction of temporal sovereign, that is, of a politically organized society, was
fundamental. It [is] natural and inevitable to have church courts and state courts, each
with their own field of action and each, perhaps, tending to encroach on the other's
domain, but each having their own province in which they were paramount .... 20
While the exact location of this boundary remains contested,
all agree that there is a line. Those who dispute the proper
location of the line (including most readers of this essay)
nonetheless presuppose the existence of the dual-authority
pattern, state andS'church, each with its sphere of proper
jurisdiction and each with some sovereignty he to the exclusion
of the other.
This dual-authorit pattern is so taken for granted in the West
that it goes unnoticed, much like a fish is unmindful of the water
in which it swims. Bernard Lewis, an expert in Islam and Middle
Eastern Studies, reminds us that vast societies can and have
arranged themselves in very different ways. Comparing Western
civilization as shaped by Christianity with the Middle East as
formed by Islam, He writes:
Nowhere are these differences more profound ... than in the attitudes of these two
religions, and of their authorized exponents, to the relations between government,
religion, and society. The Founder of Christianity bade his followers "render unto
18. John Courtney Murray, "The Freedom of Man in the Freedom of the Church," in
Modern Age (Chicago, Ill.: Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1957), 134, 137.
19. Lion Handbook, 151, 200-01.
20. Roscoe Pound, "A Comparison of Ideals of Law," Harvard Law Review 47 (1933): 1, 6.
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Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's." . . .
The dichotomy of regnum and sacerdotium, so crucial in the history of Western
Christendom, had no equivalent in Islam. During Muhammad's lifetime, the Muslims
became at once a political and a religious community, with the Prophet as head of
state .... For the formative first generation of Muslims, whose adventures are the
sacred history of Islam, there was no protracted testing by persecution, no tradition of
resistance to a hostile state power. On the contrary, the state that ruled them was that
of Islam, and God's approval of their cause was made clear to them in the form of
victory and empire in this world.
In pagan Rome, Caesar was God. For Christians, there is a choice between God
and Caesar, and endless generations of Christians have been ensnared in that choice.
In Islam, there was no such painful choice. In the universal Islamic polity as conceived
by Muslims, there is no Caesar but only God, who is the sole sovereign and the sole
source of law.2 1
Lewis goes on to point out the inherent conflict between
Islam being true to its historic authority structure, on the one
hand, and unmoderated Islam operating peacefully within the
international (and increasingly globalized) community that
assumes a Christian-like demarcation between the pohtical state
and religious organizations.
DISESTABLISHMENT
In the New World, increasing liberality with respect to
religious freedom, unlike church-state relations in Western
Europe, took an additional step namely, a state without any
established church. Disestablishment is America's unique
contribution to political philosophy.22 It meant that religion was
deregulated, a modem phrase but one which aptly emphasizes
that, ironically, disestablishment was religion being set free from
the state. 23 The promise of disestablishment was two-fold. First,
21. Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (New York: Modem
Library, 2003), 5-7. Lest Westerners jump to wrong conclusions, Lewis goes on to ref'me
his description of historic Islam using Western terminology:
From the lifetime of its Founder, and therefore in its sacred scriptures, Islam is
associated in the minds and memories of Muslims with the exercise of political and
military power. Classical Islam recognized a distinction betveen things of this world
and things of the next, between pious and worldly considerations. It did not recognize a
separate institution, with a hierarchy and laws of its own, to regulate religious matters.
Does this mean that Islam is a theocracy? In the sense God is seen as the supreme
sovereign, the answer would have to be yes indeed. In the sense of government by a
priesthood, most definitely not. The emergence of a priestly hierarchy and its
assumption of ultimate authority in the state is a modem innovation and is a unique
contribution of the late Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran to Islamic thought and practice.
Ibid., 20.
22. Sanford H. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America: A History (New York: The
MacMillan Co., 1902), 2.
23. Max L. Stackhouse notes just how remarkable was the American church-state
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disestablishment meant that churches and other religious bodies
became autonomous with respect to matters Within their
province, such as doctrine polity, and ecclesiastical
administration. Second, doctrinal disagreements within the body
politic were now of private relevance only, such debates having
nothing to do with one's standing in the political community.2
Of course disputes over religious doctnne did not go away;
disestablisfiment simply moved their resolution to arenas (e.g.,
seminaries, pulpits, Sunday school classrooms) having ony
nongovernmental salience.
A UNITARY IDEA
As the foregoing indicates, the religion question is particularly
vexing, in part, because it has to be addressed at two levels: (1")
the rdationship between government and individual adherents;
and (2) the relationship -between government and organized
religion. With respect to the first relationship, the proposition of
Western liberalism was to safeguard an iniividual's religiously
informed conscience from state coercion. With respect to the
second relationship, the uniquely American proposition was to
embrace the unitary idea of voluntaryism and lfsestablishment.
Voluntaryism is not merely the absence of government-imposed
coercion when performing acts of religious conscience. Nor is it
merely the absence of civic disabilities based on one's faith, such
proposition in that a government should go beyond the protection of free-exercise rights of
individuals and to limit its sovereignty by acknowledging another center of competence
when it comes to matters of spiritual cognizance:
[The First A]mendment to the Constitution acknowledges the existence of an arena of
discourse, activity, commitment, and organization for the ordering of life over which the
state has no authority. It is a remarkable thing in human history when the authority
governing coercive power limits itself .... However much government may become
involved in regulating various aspects of economic, technological, medical, cultural,
educational, and even sexual behaviors in society, religion is an arena that, when it is
doing its own thing, is off limits. This is not only an affirmation of the freedom of
individual belief or practice, not only an acknowledgment that the state is noncompetent
when it comes to theology, it is the recognition of a sacred domain that no secular
authority can fully control. Practically, this means that at least one association may be
brought into being in society that has a sovereignty beyond the control of government.
See Max L. Stackhouse, "Religion, Rights, and the Constitution," in An Unsettled Arena:
Religion and the Bill of Rights, ed. Ronald C. White, Jr. & Albright G. Zimmerman (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990), 92, 111.
24. Divisiveness within the body politic over a myriad of social, moral, and economic issues
is inevitable in an open democracy; indeed such debate is healthy and protected as a matter
of free speech. Instead, it is religious doctrine and other inherently religious issues more
narrowly to which the government is barred from taking sides. The restraint is on
government, not the private sector. This is desirable so as to not divide the civic polity over
purely religious questions.
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as a religious test for holding public office.25 For example, a mild
establislment, such as in tLe United Kingdom today, does not
use force against dissenters and tolerates all faiths and yet such
an establisf'ment falls short of the voluntaryist ideal. Instead,
voluntaryism is when the government refrains from seeking to
influence its citizens concerning those inherently religious beliefs
and practices of organized rehgion. Such beliefs and practices
are to be supportedvoluntarily, if at all, by the nongovernmental
sector. Voluntarp*sm is thereby a value-laden idea, as the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Wallace v. Jaffree:
[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the... First Amendment embraces the
right to select any religious faith or none at all. This conclusion derives support not
only from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of conscience, but also
from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and
voluntary choice by the faithful .... 26
Those religious faiths ("beliefs worthy of respect") subscribed to
and supported wholly apart from the government's influence are,
in this one sense, ackndwledged as both religious tenet and legal
p Lileolunta ism, disestablishment was about freedom. But
it is the sort of freedom that is the off-shoot or consequence of
limited government. This is because disestablishment was, in the
first instance, about deregulating the officially preferred religion.
It was not thought paradoxical for people of the large faith groups
to have worked, as many did, for disestablishment. They
believed, and their experience had shown that an established
church is a captive church, one where te form of worship,
content of prayers, clerical appointments, and ecclesiastical
25. Nor is voluntaryism where government extends assistance to all religious organizations
without discrimination, a principal properly called "nonpreferentialism." See Leonard W.
Levy, The Establishment Clause: Religion and the First Amendment, 2 d ed. (Chapel Hill,
N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 112-45; Thomas J. Curry, The First
Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the First Amendment (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986), 211-15.
26. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) at 52-53 (footnotes omitted).
27. The overlap of a rule of law with a religious tenet does not, without more, make the
enforcement of the legal rule a violation of the Establishment Clause. McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) at 442. Nonetheless, the formidable Jesuit, John Courtney
Murray, criticized voluntaryism as a Protestant reading of the First Amendment rather than,
as was his view, the amendment being a mere article of peace between multiple sects. John
Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition
(New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964), 58-72; see William Lee Miller, The First Liberty:
Religion and the American Republic (New York: Knopf, 1986), 134-35, 218-21. However,
Fr. Murray's role in Vatican II suggests that he came to see considerable merit in the
American church-state proposition and he successfully worked to have the Roman church
move closer to the American view. See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of Our Country:
The American Experience of Religious Freedom (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California
Press, 1998), 331-53.
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administration are interfered with by the state.
Today the combined outworking of voluntaryism and
disestablishment is commonly known as the "separation of
church and state." 28 Philip Hamburger's work proper brings
caution to the use of the phrase separation of church andstate.29
When used to convey the same ideas as those underlying
disestablishment, the phrase is useful and accurate. W hen
separation of church and state is taken to mean a socially orjuridically enforced separation of religious values from public
affairs and law formation (i.e., the privatization of religion, then
the concept has no antecedent in the early American states. In
the new republic, religion was widely expected to serve as a
seedbed of civic virtue, from which a people acquired the
knowledge to properly exercise the office ol citizen and the self-
restraint to not let liberty careen into license. James H. Hutson,
Chief of the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress,
nicely summarizes the unofficial role that religion was to pray in
the new nation as "the privatization of character buildin. '30 It
worked as the ever quotable Alexis de Tocqueville observed
during his American travels in the 1830s:
Religion in America takes no direct part in the government of society, but it must
nevertheless be regarded as the foremost of the political institutions .... I do not
know whether all the Americans have a sincere faith in their religion; for who can
search the human heart? but I am certain that they hold it to be indispensable to the
maintenance of republican institutions. This opinion is not peculiar to a class of
citizens or to a party, but it belongs to the whole nation, and to every rank of society.
The Americans combine the notions of Christianity and of liberty so intimately in their
minds, that it is impossible to make them conceive the one without the other ....
28. Some religious conservatives are fond of pointing out that the First Amendment text
does not have the phrase "separation of church and state." That is true, of course, but given
intervening events the point proves far less than these religious conservatives imply. It is
sufficient here to note that disestablishment (or "separation of church and state," rightly
understood) triumphed in state after state of the early American republic.
29. Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2000). Professor Hamburger shows that the phrase "separation of church
and state" had no or little use until well after the nation's founding, and thereafter the
phrase was at times code for discrimination against Roman Catholics. Of course, the phrase
is in wide use today and has lost its anti-Catholic taint. Nevertheless, Hamburger's central
concern is valid. He notes modern secularists twisting the phrase "separation of church and
state" to mean a separation of religious values from public debate and lawmaking. The aim
is to privatize religion. Accordingly, there is some risk in substituting the more ambiguous
"separation of church and state" for disestablishment. On the other hand, the phrase is in
common use today and resonates with a broad cross-section of the American public. The
phrase, rightly understood, will be used here.
30. James H. Hutson, Religion and the Founding of the American Republic (Washington,
D.C.: Library of Congress, 1998), 111.
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Upon my arrival in the United States, the religious aspect of the country was the first
thing that struck my attention; and the longer I stayed there, the more did I perceived
the great political consequences resulting from this new state of things, to which I was
unaccustomed. In France I had almost always seen the spirit of religion and the spirit
of freedom pursuing courses diametrically opposed to each other; but in America I
found they were intimately united, and that they reigned in common over the same
country. My desire to discover the causes of this phenomenon increased from day to
day. In order to satisfy it, I questioned the members of all the different sects .... I
found that [Catholic clergy] ... mainly attributed the peaceful dominion of religion in
their country, to the separation of church and state. I do not hesitate to affirm that
during my stay in America, I did not meet a single individual, of the clergy or of the
laity, who was not of the same opinion upon this point.31
Like voluntaryism, disestablishment is a value-laden idea.
The accumulated' experience in America was that it is almost
impossible to build a Iust society whenever the church is an arm
of the state or the state is an arm of the church. Moreover and
importantly, this experience was not gained at the national fevel.
Rakler, the American disestablishment was entirely a state-law
affair with each state proceeding at its own pace between 1776
and 1833. Thus disestablishment neither culminated with the
adoption of the Establishment Clause as part of the First
Amendment (1789-1791), nor was it hastened along by that
clause. That is, contrary to widely held belief, the Establishment
Clause did no serious work whatsoever in the furtherance of the
American disestablishment. The reason, in large measure, is
simple enough. It was known and appreciated1 in the earl
republic thatihe Establishment Clause (gong with the entire B
oP Rights) was applicable only to the national government, hence
not binding on the states. 32
At the level of each state-where the hard work of
disestablishment did take place-the vast numbers of Americans
pushing for it were not doing so out of Enlightenment-
rationalism or secularism. Nor were they primaril motivated,
because of America's diverse Protestant groups an its growing
Catholic immigration, to grant religious freedom to alf as the
price of obtaining it for themselves. Instead, these American
dissenters (e.g., Isaac Backus and John Leland) were religious
people who primarily sought disestablishment for (as they saw it)
biblical reasons. They were allied in this effort by certain well-
placed statesmen, most notably James Madison,33 and together
sought two corrections. First, they decried the state establish-
ments as interfering with organized religion, corrupting the role
31. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve (London: J. & H. G.
Langley, 1841), 1:334-35, 337.
32. The Supreme Court so noted in Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
33. See Miller, The First Liberty, 77-150; Noonan, Lustre of Our Country, 59-91.
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of clergy and the church. Second, they saw a state that took sides
in disputes over creeds and forms of religious observance as
unnecessarily roiling the body politic. They believed that these
inherently religious questions were never properly within the
jurisdiction of government. By deregulating religion, the alliance
sought a more limited state, one with no power over church
doctrine, forms of observance, selection of clergy, and church
administration. To be sure, disestablishment presumed a
unifying civil compact but at a more modest level of consensus
namely agreement on the moral principles by which the civil
polity was to make political decisions.34
For an extended period of almost sixty years, the common
efforts of these Protestant dissenters and American statesmen
sought to usher in a juridical disestablishment in those states
where Anglicanism or Congregationalism still had a hold (9 of the
original 13 states, plus Vermont and Maine). Both parties to this
common cause were essential to its success.3 5 Their efforts first
succeeded in the Anglican South and only much later in Puritan
New England. Anglicans sought to hold on in the South by
enlarging the establishment to embrace all Christian
denominations. This was unsuccessful. In New England, the
Congregational Church continued to receive financial support as
late -as '1832-33. The funding was assessed locally by majority
rule, with increasing availability of exemptions f6r
nonconformists. Neverthieless, NewEngland supporters of the
Standing Order denied that they had an establisfiment" as such,
whereas dissenters knew it to be an establishment in all but
name, albeit very differently structured from the top-down
Church of England in Great Britain.
Those against religious establishment were for religious
voluntaryism, hence the unity of the two ideas. Disestablishment
came in the midst of the Second Great Awakening
(1780s-1830s). In a sense this new wave of revival finished the
work started by the First Great Awakening (1720s-1740s),
changing how Americans thought about religion.36 Religion
34. See Murray, We Hold These Truths, 80 ("Granted that the [American] commonwealth
can be achieved in the absence of a consensus with regard to the theological truths that
govern the total life and destiny of man, it does not follow that this necessary civic unity can
endure in the absence of a consensus more narrow in its scope, operative on the level of
political life, with regard to the rational truths and moral precepts that govern the structure
of the constitutional state, specify the substance of the common weal, and determine the
ends of public policy.").
35. Sidney E. Mead, The Lively Experiment: The Shaping of Christianity in America (New
York: Harper and Row, 1963), 34-35, 38, 42-45, 51-52.
36. These two periods were not spontaneous, intercontinental, unexplained outpouring of
religious interest. Rather, these two "awakenings" were a cluster of small, regional events,
all quite intentional, well-planned, and carefully executed. The revivals were planned urban
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became more personal and emotional, less authoritarian, more
decentralized, and it focused more on guidance in daily living
and less on abstract doctrine. A top -down rule by a proe ssiona
class of ecclesiastics was at odds with the growing American ethos
of liberty and individualism and a leveling of social classes.37
By 1833, religious voluntaryism had-prevailed over the last
remaining establishment, that of Massachusetts. The Supreme
Court, later summarizing the general common law in the states
set out the rule of limited civil jurisdiction over organized
religion, and hence the line between church and state, as it had
developed by mid-nineteenth century:
[A court has no authority] where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and purely
ecclesiastical in its character-a matter over which the civil courts exercise no
jurisdiction-a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline,
ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the
standard of morals required of them-becomes the subject of its action. 3 8
The opposition (sometimes called "civic republicans"3 9) did
not go away, of course. It continued to assert whenever possible
the use of government to endorse the majority Protestant faith
(of a general, nondenominational sort). As this could no longer
be achieved with financial support for religion, the civic
republicans bargained for symbolfc affirmationand other tacit
endorsements by the government, such as ceremonial prayer on
civic occasions. This was more successful in local communities
with a fairly homogeneous Anglo-Saxon Protestantism than it was
in major cities, which were busy absorbing immigrants of diverse
events, whereas the camp meetings of the nineteenth century were held in rural settings.
Finke & Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our Religious
Economy, 2-d ed., 88-99.
37. There are scholars who believe that the manner in which the American setting
changed the Protestant faith during the early republic had some unfortunate features. The
decreased emphasis on doctrine was anti-intellectual, and the diminished role of
professional clergy and the institutional church made Christian faith less grounded. See,
e.g., Noll, America's God, 443-45. Perhaps this is so, but it does not negate that the period
was good for the cause of voluntaryism and disestablishment.
38. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872) at 733.
39. The general tendency of "civic republicans" was to place substantial trust in an
educated ruling class that functioned as an ongoing deliberative community seeking wise
and far-sighted policymaking. Religion was thought by civic republicans to be essential to
(and nurturing of the next generation in) needed civic virtues. Because such virtues were
essential to sustaining a republic, the republic/state had a vital interest in (indeed, its very
survival) religion. Thus, for civic republicans the state should support (even establish)
religion. The circle was thereby complete: religion taught civic virtue, civic virtue was
needed to sustain the republic, and thus the republic supported religion. The emergent
disestablishmentarians agreed with civic republicans, except with respect to the desirability
of the state actively supporting religion. Disestablishmentarians believed that a deregulated
religion would be revitalized, and that such a renewed and independent-sector religion
would in turn nurture the needed civic virtues supportive of the republic.
HeinOnline  -- 48 J. Church & St. 321 2006
322 JOURNAL OF CHURCH AND STATE
faiths, most prominently Catholics.40 So it must be conceded
that the practice of voluntaryism and disestablishmentarianism
that is, the separation of church and state, occasionally lagged
behind the principle. Nevertheless, for more than a century, the
matter of keeping church and state within their proper spheres
was the near exclusive province of the several states.
THE MODERN COURT
In the 1940s and 1950s, the United States Supreme Court
was in the vanguard of the rights revolution. Clause by clause,
many provisions of the federal Bill of Rights were "selectively
incorporated" through the Fourteenth Amendment and made
binding on the states. When the Establishment Clause was
incorporated in 1947 by Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing
Township,41 the Supreme Court faced something of a paradox.
Unlike previously incorporated clauses from the Bill of Rights,
the Establishment Clause text did not read as a rights-based
clause but, instead, spoke to the negation of federal power with
respect to religious establishment. This meant that the clause
worked, in part, as a federalism provision restraining the national
government from interfering with how the states handled the
sensitive matter of religion.42 For example, if Connecticut
wanted a state church, Congress had no authority to stop it. And
indeed, Connecticut did not stop funding the Congregationa
(Puritan) Church until 1818. Thus, incorporating the
Establishment Clause in Everson destroyed the clause's role as a
restraint on national power to oversee the states. That left a
clause emptied of much of its original purpose, a vessel needing
to be filled with new meaning about relations between govern-
ment and church at the state and local level. For that meaning
the Supreme Court drew upon the period (1776-1833) of the
ascendance of voluntaryism and America's state-by-state
disestablishment (especially that of Virginia, 1776-1786).
This was a judicial novation, simultaneously aggressive and
bold.43 It was aggressive because the Supreme Court expanded
40. Finke & Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and Losers in Our
Religious Economy, 2 d ed., 11.7-55.
41. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) at 13-16.
42. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 32-45. The Establishment Clause also worked to
restrain the national government concerning laws respecting a national establishment, both
in the central government's own internal administration and when meeting its national
responsibilities.
43. Neither attribution is necessarily a compliment or a criticism. It depends on one's view
of the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court in "overcoming" federalism and bringing about
economic modernization and national uniformity.
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federal judicial power to include policing state and local
governments when and where they touched religion-which
happens often and nearly everywhere. The new and expanded
tasI of the federal judiciary, in church-state relations, was to
restrain the exercise of civil power in matters specifically
religious, whether that power was bein utilized to help or hinder
organized religion. The adoption of ae lega fiction of taxpayer
standing in F ast v. Cohen,4 permitted the Court to police the
church-state boundary even in the absence of a complainant
suffering coercion of conscious (religious burden), showing just
how determined was the Court to enforce voluntaryism and
disestablishmentarianism.
While bold, it was a legal development that Americans have,
since Everson, lived with now for sixty years. Like Henry
Hig ins's regard for Eliza Doolittle in My Fair Lady, we have
simply grown accustomed to having Everson around. To be sure,
there are voices on the right that still call for placing the springs
of government behind their Christian faith--beit in a
noncoercive and nondenominational manner. And there are
voices on the left seeking to work the levers of government to
deny equal access for traditional religion in social and political
debate. Both these efforts will be spurned, or should be, because
the American proposition has proven best for organized religion
and best for a government commodious to participation by those
of all faiths or none. Despite its maddening complexity and
occasional inconsistency, in the main the American electorate
senses this is so.
As the American church-state proposition continues to be
worked out in new and untried settings, many tensions remain.
Religious Americans often insist that their rights are God-given
or "endowed by their Creator." It is therefore impossible, within
such framewor, for these rights to be denied by the actions of
government officials (said to be, as they phrased it,
unalienable").45 Other Americans argue that fundamental
rights, at least positive-law rights-indeed, the authority of the
civil state in its entirety-are derived ultimately from "the
people" or the ongoing consent of the governed.46 When
America was a new nation, these two groups were very much one
44. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Court in Flast held that even in the absence of
actual "injury in fact," federal courts have standing to hear federal taxpayer claims brought
under the Establishment Clause where it is alleged that congressional appropriations are
being wrongly channeled to religion.
45. Those making this argument typically reference the first, second, and closing
paragraphs of the 1776 Declaration of Independence.
46. Those taking this position typically point to the lack of references to God in the 1787
Constitution of the United States and the 1791 Bill of Rights.
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and the same, thus these two views on the ultimate origin of
fundamental rights caused little disagreement in church-state
relations. But today the origin and immutability of rights are the
cause of major disagreement. The conflict is most easily seen in
hot-button questions such as eliminating "under God" from the
Pledge of Allegiance or "In God We Trust" from our money, as
well as removing the Ten Commandments from courthouse
squares and capitol lawns.
Still others maintain that there is substantive moral content to
a modem democracy that is centered on individual autonomy in
social and sexual relations-not just a promise of fair process to
the exclusion of ends. And, they say, future Americans should
draw legal guidance from this rule of autonomous choice.
Perhaps this works with respect to some legislative concerns, but
matters become heated wien the claim is that this is how an
unelected federal judiciary should read the U.S. Constitution.
One has to strain to leverage into the constitutional structure and
text such a radical individualism. All oxymoronic talk of a "living
constitution" aside, constitutionalizing values not remotely
attributable to the founding Jeopardizes the security of a
government bound in perpetuity, hence limited, by a written
document. That is, to admit that there is an American
constitutional order is to necessarily deny that an elite bevy of
judges, charged byMarbury v. Madison with husbanding the
Constitution, get to make it up" as time goes on.
CONCLUSION
Talk of culture war is all around. James Davison Hunter, a
sociologist of religion, classifies those with traditional beliefs as
"orthodox," and the theologically liberal groups as religious
"progressives."47  The meaningfil division, he argues, is now
orthodox (Protestant, Catholic, and Jew) versus proZressives
(Protestant, Catholic, and Jew). Hunter explains that the reli-
iously orthodox (or "traditionalist") are devoted "to an external,
efinable, and transcendent authority," whereas progressives
"resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing assump-
tions of contemporary life." Religious progressives are declining,
whereas the energetic traditionalists are increasing and now
comprise the largest group of religious Americans.48 There is a
47. James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York:
Basic Books, 1991), 42-48.
48. Finke & Stark, The Churching of America, 1776-2005, 235, 244-53, 267-81. Outside of
the United States the largest and fastest growing religion is Christianity. See Philip Jenkins,
The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2002). The expansion within world Christianity is among those churches holding
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third group on the rise in America: secularists (and those who,
having only a private faith, function as such) who hold to no
serious theistic belief. Many of them profess an interest in
spirituality but not in religion (by which they mean orthodox
religion). Although they dro not total even half the number of
religious traditionalists, these secularists disproportionately hold
positions of influence and power, well-placed in academia,
government, business, media, and popular entertainment. Thus
what we observe around us today as culture war is less a clash of
religious traditionalists with religious progressives, and more a
clash of religious traditionalists with these secularists.
Given these two complex realities, state and church, a
continuous dialog must proceed to enable those needed
adjustments in their interrelationship to meet new and
unforeseen situations. The dialectic is often disharmonious and
inches forward with denials and affirmations, charges and
recrimination, reconstructions and compromise. Neither state
nor church will come to a resting place that will not provoke a
new rejoinder. Yet it is possible to discern some order in this
multiplicity, to stop the dialogue, as it were, at certain formative
points in Western civilization, and to say this is the path upon
wyhich we as a society have embarked. For America, this
formative period occurred as the newly constituted states, united
in a nascent federal republic, slowly shifted from a privileged
Protestantism to a state-by-state deregulation of a preferred
church. This went beyond the protection of religously informed
conscience (the first half of the religion question) to the unitary
concept of voluntaryism and disestablishmentarianism (the
secona half of the religion question).
What, then, was America's answer to governance and the
religion question? It was, first, a generosity toward the cause of
conscience and, second, the promise of free churches in a limited
state. These, then, are the rational political principles of the
nation when it comes to ordering church-state relations. They
have proven an overall good, one em irically demonstrable. As
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor recentfy wrote: "At a time when
we see around tie world the violent consequences of the
assumption of religious authority by government, Americans may
count themselves fortunate: Our regard for constitutional
boundaries has protected us from similar travails.... Those who
would renegotiate the boundaries between church and state must
therefore answer a difficult question: Why would we trade a
system that has served us so well for one that has served others so
traditional biblical doctrines and morally conservative views, as well as preferring a
Pentecostal worship style.
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poorly?" 49
49. McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. __
125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) at 2746 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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